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"Our society will not take more than three or five years of rioting every summer without the machine of government beginning to erode," he said. "If we do not solve this to gether there will start a wave of repression that all of us here will live to regret."

In commenting on conditions in the slums, Mr. Heiskell aligned himself with the view of Whitney Young, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, saying that "without justice we neither will have nor do we deserve order."

In his address, Mr. Heiskell also urged that labor unions move more rapidly to "open their ranks" to Negroes and Puerto Ricans and that private foundations set aside a third of their funds over the next three years for training programs in the slums.

Charles L. Gleason, personnel director of Time Inc., said last night that "the Heiskell hiring plan is now before the board, and we are actively discussing just how to implement it." The company has 2,500 employees in the city.

EXCELLENT RECORD OF THE MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. President, a recent editorial in the Baltimore Sun drew my attention to a publication of the Maryland Department of Employment Security, entitled "Advance Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1967."

The report reveals an impressive array of statistics and shows that, among other things, unemployment in Maryland dropped by 4,500 in fiscal year 1967. Non-agricultural and salaried workers averaged 1,166,300—up 69,400 over the 1966 total.

There is plenty of other good news in the report. I agree with the Sun that the department of unemployment security is to be commended for making these encouraging figures available to the public as early as possible.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Baltimore Sun editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AN EXCELLENT RECORD

The Maryland Department of Employment Security has issued a pamphlet entitled: "Advance Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1967." The regular reports are never issued until January or February—more than six months after the close of the year covered. No more than a glance through the advance pamphlet should be enough to explain why the department should have wanted to rush into print with the year-end facts as quickly as possible—the facts could be no better.

Through the 12-month period non-agricultural wage and salaried workers averaged 1,166,300—up 69,400 over the 1966 total. The unemployment total dropped by 4,500. The increase in the one area and the contraction in the other resulted in a reduction of \$605,000 in the amount distributed in benefits to unemployed persons who lost their jobs through no fault of their own.

From the viewpoint of the employers who finance the full burden of unemployment compensation there are these facts: In fiscal 1967 the tax rate schedule applied against employers on the basis of their respective employment records was the lowest in the State's history of the program. The outlook for a continuation of that schedule is excellent; at the end of the year the trust fund behind the program was at its highest figure.

The array of facts in the report, and this without exception, provides good news for

those in the labor markets, employers and the public generally. The advance report is welcome not only because it contains good news but it displays a desire on the part of a State agency to report quickly to the public—a desire that is rare if not unique among State departments.

INTERNATIONAL ESPIONAGE

Mr. THURMOND, Mr. President, Monday's edition of the State, of Columbia, S.C., contains an extremely interesting column by Henry J. Taylor, Mr. Taylor is a former U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland, and in that position he was able to see the complicated role which international espionage plays in modern history. The unique situation in Switzerland as a model country made it a particularly valuable vantage point for Mr. Taylor's observations.

In his column published in the State, Mr. Taylor draws upon his own observations and upon recent writings by Svetlana Alliluyeva to show the importance which the Soviets place upon espionage activity. I quote the last two paragraphs from Mr. Taylor's excellent article:

Former Central Intelligence Agency chief Allen W. Dulles has stated that "the Soviet had over 40 high-level agents in various Washington departments and agencies during World War II. At least this many were uncovered; we don't know how many remained undetected."

It would be inconceivable to any experienced intelligence manager that there are any fewer in decision-making places in Washington today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COLUMNISTS RECALL SOVIET INTRIGUES: ESPIONAGE IS TRICKY BUSINESS

(By Henry J. Taylor)

Svetlana Alliluyeva's widely syndicated "Twenty Letters to a Friend" pictures her father's Kremlin from the inside. Another book, "A Man Called Lucy," by Pierre Accoce and Pierre Quet, along with my own findings in Switzerland, (while U.S. Ambassador there) shows Stalin's treasure-trove of espionage in that neutral territory with equally stark revelation.

During the wartime period Svetlana writes about, the Soviet did not have diplomatic relations with Switzerland. But a blond, anti-Nazi giant named Hans Bernd Gisevius who was a vice-consul at the German legation in Bern under the direction of Hitler's secret service, became a pipe line to us. So did another sympathetic anti-Nazi, an assistant to German Ambassador Koehler. This was an "unvetted source," a man who remains as mysterious and unidentified to his employers (our country) as to the enemy against whom he works.

The cafe Grief in Zurich was a center for interagency agents and transient refugees, and courageous U.S. Army Colonel Barnwell R. Legge, our military attache at Bern, practically controlled this center.

The Swiss Army's Brigadier-Colonel Roger Masson, in turn, chief of Swiss counterintelligence, was in contact with German S. S. Brigadefuhrer Walter Schellenberg who ultimately emerged a hero of the German anti-Hitler movement.

We passed their information on to Stalin. What we never knew was that Stalin had his own immensely successful espionage apparatus in Lausanne, the information out-

put of which was astounding and would have saved countless American lives. Stalin couldn't have helped us less if he had been Hitler himself. The Soviet simply stood by, took everything and gave nothing.

German Communists call an agent "kaltegestalt" in the technical jargon of Soviet espionage if the man is "on ice" between missions. German Communists had penetrated the highest levels of the German army, navy and air force general staffs and even Hitler's personal entourage. Moreover, the German Communists had about 20 German resident directors trained at the Soviet spy school at Sekhjdnya and operating espionage centers throughout wartime Germany. They controlled some 300 German Communist agents. But they faced the problem of communicating with the Kremlin.

A remarkably able Red agent named Rudolph Roessler was "kaltegestalt" in Berlin and the German Communist party faithful sent him under cover to Lausanne. Red agents often confirm their contacts by producing currency notes that bear consecutive serial numbers. Roessler provided this identification to comrade "Leon," the head of the Communist party in Switzerland. Leon set up Roessler and a Moscow-beamed radio in Lausanne and supplied him a group of helpers based in Geneva.

Relaying the top-level information received from the Communists inside Germany, the Lausanne nest established what was designated as the "Viking Line"—direct to Stalin.

Stalin was called Koba by his few intimates. It was the code name he supplied Lausanne. The Red nest reported to him in advance, sometimes months in advance such vital secrets as Germany's seizure of Austria. It also rushed him the first hint of Hitler's decision to stage the horrible pogroms against the Jews. The Lausanne nest found this did not ruffle Stalin. He had an intense hatred of Jews and purged them on a scale proportionate to Nazi Germany, a fact implied even by Svetlana in her "Twenty Letters."

Hitler invaded Poland, the attack which precipitated World War II, on a slim pretext forged by his own secret service. The Lausanne nest forecast his move. It foretold to Stalin the invasion of Holland, Belgium, northeast France, Luxembourg, Denmark and Norway, each in advance, and sent him the first mention of V-1 and V-2 rockets that were to come, about which we knew nothing and which fell chiefly on us of the West.

The Communists burrow everywhere. And there are always Red agents and provocateurs masquerading as supporters of men in power. The prize—and priceless—information needed by these burrowers is: What will the men in power do next?

Former Central Intelligence Agency chief Allen W. Dulles has stated that "the Soviet had over 40-high-level agents in various Washington departments and agencies during World War II. At least this many were uncovered; we don't know how many remained undetected."

It would be inconceivable to any experienced intelligence manager that there are any fewer in decision-making places in Washington today.

THE SECRET OF HAWAII

Mr. INOUE, Mr. President, many visitors to Hawaii often wonder how our residents can bear to be confined to the island chain for a lifetime. Perhaps two writers from the Hartford Courant, Shirley and Bob Sloane, have discovered the answer.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.